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The Rules of Law
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1 The Courts
Criminal Trials as Strategic Arenas
Brian Doherty and Graeme Hayes
In this chapter we analyze cases where social movement activists are pros-
ecuted in the courts for protest actions. The courthouse is a significant arena 
for social movement strategy, a symbolic site for the arbitration of collective 
disputes, the legitimization of political action, and the production of social 
meaning; the court is “one of society’s most sacred institutions since its role 
in def ining, interpreting and enforcing the law puts it in close proximity to 
the moral basis of society” (Antonio, 1972: 291-292). The outcomes of trials 
depend on the organization of the criminal justice system but also the 
responses and strategies of multiple other players, inside and outside the 
court, including social movement activists, allies and supporters.
In common with the other chapters in this volume, our argument here is 
about “breaking down the state,” about thinking through the relationships 
of power and agency that def ine the interactions between state and non-
state players. We seek to go beyond conceptualizations of state-movement 
relationships which might cast criminal trials merely as “state repression,” 
setting out the architecture of the court as an arena for political interaction 
and tactical choice, identifying the players who act within it, and arguing 
that more attention be given to the courts in analyses of protest action.
Social Movements and the Law
It is perhaps surprising therefore that the study of social movements has 
so far afforded relatively little place to analyzing and understanding the 
role, forms and outcomes of criminal prosecutions in the trajectories of 
movements and the fates of the individual activists that constitute them. 
The criminal law – “arguably the most direct expression of the relationship 
between a State and its citizens” (Law Commission for England and Wales, 
1989) – fulf ills a role of symbolic social regulation; it def ines, delineates, 
and enforces the codes which demarcate the sphere of legitimate social 
and political action, enabling the identif ication and repression of what 
is considered deviant, illegitimate behavior. Yet it is precisely on this line 
of demarcation that social movements operate, because they represent 
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constituencies whose choices and identities are repressed by the law, or they 
organize challenges to the dominant arrangement of the social, political, 
cultural and economic order, or they engage in political actions which 
deliberately disrupt legitimated modes of interest representation. Indeed, 
as Dinos and Gibelin point out in their discussions of factory occupations 
in France in 1936, “all the achievements of the working class have involved 
methods operating either at the margin of the law, or in clear opposition 
to it” (1986: 130).
More generally, the relationship between social movements and the law 
is fundamental because the law is not just a system of social regulation 
and resource distribution but the site of production of systems of meaning. 
Courts are thus physical arenas in which defendants (one set of players) 
are ascribed symbolic roles: guilty or innocent, convicted or acquitted or 
discharged or, in some criminal justice systems, not proven; and, where 
guilt is demonstrated, they are arenas in which consequent tariffs are ap-
plied, reflecting the circumstances and gravity of the proscribed act. But 
courts are arenas for the production of meaning in other senses, including 
the construction of political and symbolic challenge, and the interplay of 
formal, rational-legal justice with other, “natural,” extra-legal, forms of 
justice. In this sense, the goal of social actors, when they are challengers 
within the legal system, is to reveal the claims of the law to neutrality 
and universality as particular and partial relations of power. If, as Melucci 
says, the function of players in social conflicts is “to reveal the stakes, to 
announce to society that a fundamental problem exists in a given area” 
(1985: 797), then criminal trials offer a regulated space of engagement for 
the construction and revelation of these stakes through the interplays of 
persuasion and coercion.
The extensive literature on “legal mobilization” – broadly, “the idea that 
the law has the potential to be an effective instrument for political or social 
change” (Vanhala, 2011: 6) – has developed a wide understanding of the roles, 
motivations, and effects on social movement campaigns of one set of the 
many players in the courts – in particular, legal professionals. The emphasis 
is foremost on cause lawyers, those who “commit themselves and their legal 
skills to furthering a vision of the good society” (Sarat and Scheingold, 1998: 
3) and so help movements “def ine the realm of the possible” (Sarat and 
Scheingold, 2005: 10), on collective litigation strategies articulated explicitly 
around rights claims making (Scheingold, 2010; McCann, 1994; Epp, 1998) 
and, on “legal opportunity,” where the emergence, progress and outcomes 
of litigation are influenced, if not determined, by the conditions of access to 
the court arena (the attribution of “standing”), the availability of potential 
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issue frames (“legal stock”), and the extent of judicial receptivity (Hilson, 
2002; Andersen, 2005; De Fazio, 2012).
Here, we seek to broaden the analysis of social movements and the law. 
In the following sections of this chapter we therefore examine the strate-
gies typically pursued by social movement players facing prosecution. Our 
principal focus is on groups involved in campaigns of deliberate lawbreak-
ing in Western democracies, such as environmentalists, anti-advertising 
campaigners, and campaigners against nuclear weapons or militarism more 
generally. Following this, and as a necessary consequence, we examine 
how the formal rules of the judicial arena shape the choices available to 
various players, and how the players adapt tactically to the properties of the 
arena. We base our case mainly on evidence from civil (France and Belgium) 
and common law jurisdictions (England and Wales, and the United States), 
drawing out differences between the roles of judges, juries, prosecutors, and 
lawyers in each type of system, which then affect the form of the court as 
arena. Our data are drawn from observation of trials, trial reports, interviews 
with activists, and the alternative and mainstream media. We start by dis-
cussing the broad types of crime most relevant for social movement players.
Social Crime
In the late 1960s and 1970s, influential Marxist historians in Britain began 
to discuss the development of the legal code in early modern England, and 
especially the extraordinary extension in the eighteenth century of capital 
criminal offences in what was widely known as the “Bloody Code.” In their 
work (Hobsbawm, 1969; Hay et al., 2011; Thompson, 1975), they discussed 
and developed the notion of “social crime,” where “the perpetrators oper-
ated within a broad local custom or customary consensus of right,” and 
“often had the support or silent acquiescence of signif icant parts of the 
community” (Linebaugh, 2011: xlviii). The category of social crime revealed 
an embryonic working-class resistance to the development of the modern 
capitalist state based on individual property rights, opposing “customary 
forms of compensation” – poaching, smuggling, wrecking, the breaking 
of enclosures, and so on – to a criminal code that served the ruling class, 
“constantly recreating the structure of authority which arose from property 
and in turn protect[ing] its interests” (Hay et al., 2011: 25). In a 1979 essay, 
Rule ref ined social crime into two categories: “survival crimes,” activi-
ties integral to “getting or supplementing a living,” which were not held 
to be crimes by those committing them and were considered legitimate 
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by popular opinion; and “protest crimes,” such as pulling down fences, 
rick-burning, cattle-maiming and machine-breaking. In contrast, these 
were “not in themselves regarded as legitimate actions in all circumstances 
and by whomsoever committed” (Rule, 1997: 161, 156).
Defined in this way, “social” crime is closely connected with its particular 
historical context. The concept remains relevant, however, for understand-
ing the choices and actions of players engaged in collective political chal-
lenges to prevalent social norms. Indeed, re-categorizing social crime as 
“direct action” and “civic” crime can enable us to better understand the kind 
of actions for which contemporary social movement players f ind themselves 
prosecuted in the courts. Here, “direct action” crime refers to action which is 
understood as unlawful even if politically legitimate by those undertaking 
it. It is deliberately undertaken as such in order to advance a collective cause. 
Our second category is “civic crime.” Like Rule’s “survival” crime, civic crime 
is not perceived or undertaken as deliberately unlawful, but is based in the 
customary praxis of a community or group which has been criminalized 
by power-holders, though it does not necessarily refer to actions integral to 
material survival. Contemporary examples of such praxis include struggles 
over civic rights and freedoms, and involve the criminalization of private 
behaviors as well as of public manifestations of collective identity in defense 
of a social, sexual or ethnic minority constituency. Those prosecuted for 
civic crime are not necessarily activists themselves, but their trials may 
become the focus for social movement campaigns. Examples might include 
the prosecution of homosexuality, of women for illegal abortions, or of 
women whose religious dress codes have been prohibited in public spaces.
Our focus in this chapter is on the f irst of our categories of social crime, 
direct action crime. We replace Rule’s broader category of protest crime 
with this specif ic term in order to reflect the changes in the relationship 
between protest and citizenship that have taken place in the states forming 
our study since the eighteenth century. In this we follow Tilly’s discussion 
of the transformation of protest in France and Britain between the mid-
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, from reactive to proactive claims by 
movements and from bifurcated to autonomous action repertoires (Tilly, 
1978; 1995). This transformation resulted in the legalization of some forms 
of protest, and is reflected in the specif icity of illegal forms of direct action 
in which discursive struggles for legitimacy are central, much as they were 
for Rule’s “protest crime” in the eighteenth century.
Protesters prosecuted for “direct action crime” in our chosen states typi-
cally (1) stress their non-violence, (2) defend their actions in courts as those 
of responsible citizens, acting on the basis of collective moral principles, and 
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(3) seek to persuade the magistrates and jury as fellow citizens that their 
actions were justif ied. Direct action crime thus includes civil disobedience 
but is not reducible to it. The latter is normatively considered to entail an 
acceptance of the right of the state to arrest and punish its adherents (Rawls, 
1991; Bedau, 1991); but for some movements, illegal action is justif ied irre-
spective of whether the state decides to prosecute. A second difference from 
civil disobedience is that direct action crime is not necessarily intended as 
an appeal to the political authorities to place an issue on the political agenda 
or to “correct” oversights of the democratic system. Rather, direct action 
which causes material damage is often defended as politically legitimate 
in itself, whether carried out covertly or publicly. Furthermore, whereas for 
liberal political theory, once formal democratic rights have been achieved, 
social crime (both direct action and civic variants) is at best a theoretical 
paradox and at worst an oxymoron, for players engaged in contentious 
politics it captures the way that strategies for social and political change 
often involve illegal, challenging action and thereby establishes the political 
and normative, as opposed to the natural, character of law. In this sense, 
therefore, social crime is social movement politics by other means, and it is 
consistent with the argument that protest is likely to increase rather than 
decline in established democracies (Goldstone, 2004).
The idea of “social crime” has been the subject of much critical discussion, 
particularly over its unstable boundaries (see Lea, 2002: 37-39). We f ind 
the concept useful nevertheless because it highlights that the “anti-social” 
nature of criminal activity is not a pre-determined given. Rather, the social 
nature of crime depends upon its discursive production by movement play-
ers, as they seek to frame their (illegal) action such that its objectives are 
acknowledged to be not “individualistic, self ish, or cruel” (Linebaugh, 2011: 
xlviii). The def inition of crime as social is thus one of the fundamental 
stakes of the trial process. The concept of social crime is useful, therefore, 
because it draws our attention to tactics and to interaction around the law; it 
enables us to cast our eyes toward the ways in which social movements seek 
to establish authority and legitimacy when their actions are criminalized.
Trials, Players, and Arenas
The significance of criminal prosecutions and trials therefore lies in the fact 
that they are regular, routine, “normal” activities for many social movements 
(Barkan, 2006: 183), undertaken in highly codif ied public settings, struc-
tured around the justif ication and opposition of ideas and actions, produced 
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by the dynamic interaction of players whose roles are clearly def ined, and 
which potentially carry far-reaching consequences. We may surmise that 
the transformative potential of criminal trials lies in a combination of 
their dramatic and didactic functions; for Falk, “the very limitations of 
time and space afforded by the courtroom promote a social concentration 
that enhances the narrative and legitimation potential of the proceedings” 
(2008: 12). Above all, trials are a strategic arena for movement players. One 
experienced Belgian anti-militarist activist expressed it this way:
Law and the judicial system is part of the political battlef ield. I am 
personally interested in how movements can act in this battlef ield, keep 
their space for action open and disarm legal repression by turning it into 
something useful for their campaigns. Such strategizing means on the 
one hand looking at how legal systems frame the possibility to get rights 
and which space they leave for political action. This is both a question 
of f inding legal arguments to base your cause on and coping with the 
framing of the debate through the legal procedure.
On the other hand trials take place in a political context. Of course legal 
repression is a mean to keep movements silent. For social movements 
strategizing implies looking at the possibilities to avoid prosecution, 
to turn trials into campaigning tools and how to be able to continue 
campaigning under repression. Court decisions and the decision to 
prosecute are heavily inf luenced by how society reacts. Coping with 
trials is not only a question of legal strategy, but also a question of media, 
mobilizing allies for public support and how to strengthen activists to 
drop their fear.1
In the courthouse, trials therefore present a series of tactical dilemmas for 
movement actors, with tactical considerations dependent upon strategic 
def initions of successful outcomes (the relationship between ideology and 
objectives) and the likelihood of their attainability (the interplay between 
players, resources, culture, and systems). Tactical decision making can 
therefore be expected to vary as a function of both the specif ic properties 
of the trial arena and the strategies deployed by opposing players, such 
as prosecutors and, occasionally, countermovements. In common law 
systems especially, the presence of a third set of players, jurors, can also 
be expected to affect the strategic calculus of players on both sides. The 
1 H., personal email communication, March 2012.
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specif ic composition of trial arenas can therefore be a crucial factor in the 
structure of interaction.
In criminal trials in both civil and common law traditions, juries and 
magistrates broadly fulf ill the same functions. Where they sit, it is the 
role of juries to decide on matters of fact, on the basis of the evidence and 
guidance in law presented to them; it is the role of magistrates to decide 
on matters of law, on the basis of analogy between the facts and the rules. 
In both civil and common law systems, where trials are heard without 
juries – in other words, by bench – magistrates combine the functions of 
ruling in fact and law; and in both systems, the vast majority of criminal 
cases are heard in this way.
These broad similarities of function mask significant cultural and opera-
tional differences between legal systems, however. In the Anglo-American 
tradition, juries are fundamental to the construction of the fairness of 
the criminal justice system. Juries are seen as representatives of the com-
munity and repositories of natural justice, capable of counterbalancing 
excessive state power; the defense in United States v. Berrigan, representing 
the Catonsville Nine (a group of anti-war activists who were put on trial in 
October 1968 for pouring napalm over and setting fire to draft board records 
in Catonsville, Maryland), said this to the jury: “[W]e are speaking to the 
community, and we are hoping to reach you, a microcosm, a small segment, 
12 people, four alternates, who are the community sitting in judgment” 
(Kunstler, 1969: 72).
The jury remains a powerful symbol of citizen participation in the law 
– a symbolic power which may persist even where the jury’s sociological 
composition is structured against the defendant.2 Tocqueville, indeed, 
recognizes that the jury is both a judicial and a political institution, placing 
fundamental social choices directly in the hands of the people,3 as important 
as universal suffrage to the exercise of popular sovereignty (1961: 405). In 
both England and the United States, the right to trial by jury is enshrined 
in the founding charters of the state (Magna Carta, the Declaration of 
Independence, the Constitution of the United States). As Pole points out, 
the jury’s importance lies not simply in its socially representative nature, 
but in its capacity for moral agency: in early modern England, for example, 
2 To be sure, the nature of the community represented in the jury is dependent upon the 
long-run rules of access which determine its racial, gender, and class composition, as well as 
short-term considerations for specif ic cases, and upon the practices of jury packing or jury 
strengthening (on this point, see Thompson, 1986).
3 In the English case in the mid-nineteenth century, property-owning men.
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juries frequently “notoriously mitigated the severities of the law by f inding 
guilt of lesser crimes than those charged, where these could lead to the 
death penalty, and often showed a propensity to side with those accused 
of social crimes” (Pole, 2002: 102). The power of nullif ication – where a jury 
“refuses to follow the law and convict in a particular case even though 
the facts seem to allow no other conclusion but guilt” (Weinstein, 1992: 
239) – remains part of the arsenal of Anglo-American juries, a power secured 
in both contexts through acts of resistance within the courthouse to the 
exercise of authoritarian control.4
Systems and Outcomes
In the civil law tradition, however, the cultural projection of justice is rather 
different. In such systems, fairness is imagined in the criminal procedure 
as centralized codif ication: as equality, rationality, professionalization, 
and the elimination of error. Where juries are therefore central to the 
common law projection of justice, they are much less signif icant in the 
civil law tradition. In France, for example, juries are only present in major 
criminal cases (“crimes,” def ined by prospective sentences of at least ten 
years in prison), judged in cours d’assises, and even then the jury of twelve 
includes the three sitting magistrates. Less serious offences (“délits”) are 
held in tribunaux correctionnels before a magistrate, normally accompanied 
by two assessors, or for very minor offences carrying no possibility of a 
custodial sentence (“contraventions”), in tribunaux de police, again before 
a magistrate.5 Of cases brought to court in France in 2008, only 0.4 percent 
concerned crimes; the vast majority, 92.2 percent, concerned délits (Timbart, 
2009). In contrast, the thresholds for accessing a jury trial are far lower in 
England and Wales. Here, again, there are three broad categories of offence: 
summary, tried by bench, in a Magistrates court; indictable, tried by jury 
in a Crown court; and “either way” offences, where defendants can elect to 
be committed for trial by jury in a Crown court. This last category includes 
theft, robbery, some forms of trespass, and under the 1971 Criminal Damage 
Act, criminal damage of an estimated value in excess of £5,000. This charge 
is faced frequently by direct action protesters.
4 See Barkan (1983) for a discussion of the restraints placed on nullif ication in the United 
States.
5 A similar hierarchy operates in Belgium.
This content downloaded from 
             86.23.78.145 on Fri, 18 Dec 2020 08:38:36 UTC               
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
the courtS 35
The differential effects of juries on trial proceedings are perhaps most vis-
ible in trial outcome data. In England and Wales, juries produce acquittals 
in criminal cases more frequently than magistrates sitting alone. Conviction 
rates in Magistrates courts are traditionally high: for summary offences 
dealt with in these courts in 1999, only 2.2 percent produced not guilty 
verdicts after trial. In contrast, for indictable offences which came to trial 
in Crown courts (i.e., where defendants pleaded not guilty), 62 percent were 
acquitted (Auld, 2001, Appendix 4). More recent figures confirm this propor-
tion: according to Ministry of Justice statistics, 64 percent of defendants who 
pleaded not guilty in cases dealt with in 2010 were acquitted, although only 
28 percent of these were acquitted by the jury.6 The comparison is perhaps 
most relevant for either-way offences: of the 296,000 either-way cases tried 
by Magistrates courts in 1999, 11,000 resulted in acquittals (3.7 percent); 
in contrast, of the 56,000 either-way cases completed the same year after 
being committed to the Crown court for trial, 13,000 resulted in acquit-
tal (23.2 percent) (Auld, 2001, Appendix 4). For a given criminal offence, 
therefore, the probability of acquittal is significantly higher when tried by 
jury rather than by bench.
In practice, therefore, where activists commit a criminal offence related 
to direct action – acts of trespass, criminal damage, theft, public order 
offences, and so on – there are structural differences between the type of 
trial that they can expect to face, and thus the composition and population 
of the court arena, depending on the judicial context. Indeed, for the type 
of offence likely to be committed by social movement actors, in civil law 
systems there is effectively no opportunity to make a case before a jury.7 The 
major difference is between a jury trial in the common law tradition with 
(in the broadest statistical terms) a signif icant possibility of securing an 
acquittal; and a bench trial in the civil law tradition, with a low probability 
6 Of the rest, 62 percent were discharged by the judge, 8 percent were acquitted on the direc-
tion of the judge, and 1 percent were acquitted by other means (Ministry of Justice, 2011: 91).
7 It is of course possible that movement actors will commit serious violent crime. We have 
excluded “terrorist” offences from our discussion for reasons of space, but it is worth noting 
here that for a variety of reasons (the potential for jury intimidation, jury bias, the public 
dissemination of classif ied information), jury trials in such cases are considered problematic 
and defendants are often subjected to specif ic judicial regimes. In France, terrorist cases have 
been held in special assize courts without jury since 1986; in the United Kingdom, juries were 
suspended in Northern Ireland in 1973 (though not in the rest of the UK); in the United States, 
juryless military tribunals were introduced in November 2001 for foreign nationals indicted on 
terrorist charges (though US citizens are tried before a jury); in Belgium, the right of defendants 
in “political trials” to be tried before a jury is constitutionally protected, but since 2003, “terrorist” 
trials are held without a jury in special assize courts.
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of acquittal. This probability is not nil, of course; magistrates in both civil 
and common law systems have on occasion demonstrated their own moral 
agency and capacity to produce relative innovation with respect to the law. 
However, Stengers argues that, in civil law systems especially, the concern 
for sécurité juridique – the security of the law – limits this, rendering this 
capacity for innovation necessarily weak (2004: 23-28).
Evidence comparing trials for criminal damage caused by anti-GMO 
“crop-trashers” in England and France supports this general hypothesis 
(Doherty and Hayes, 2012; 2014). In France, between February 1998 and Janu-
ary 2012, courts in 23 different towns heard 28 prosecutions, with 13 verdicts 
taken to appeal, with activists consistently pleading a “necessity” defense, 
arguing that their deliberate destruction of genetically engineered crops 
was designed to stop a greater harm. On three occasions magistrates did not 
convict, agreeing with the defendants that they had acted legitimately out 
of necessity, and acquitting them. On a further occasion, at Poitiers in June 
2011, defendants were discharged after the trial was nullif ied for procedural 
reasons. On each of these four occasions, the decision was subsequently 
overturned on appeal. In other words, on each occasion, trial has resulted 
in conviction, either on initial hearing or on appeal.
Comparison with the fate of defendants tried for similar actions in 
England proves instructive. Most notoriously, Greenpeace UK destroyed 
a f ield of GM crops at Lyng in Norfolk in 1999; all 28 activists were twice 
acquitted at Norwich Crown Court the following year. Only one jury trial 
of “crop-trashers” produced a conviction (in 2003, for an action in 2001); 
the two activists found guilty received f ines. This is in line with a broader 
pattern in England where over the previous ten years, prosecutions of 
protesters against new roads, incinerators and nuclear, chemical and arms 
trade companies frequently produced acquittals on the basis of lawful 
excuse defenses. In 2000-2001 the Crown Prosecution Service lost three 
major trials against anti-GMO activists, and this trend has carried on since 
the scaling-down of such activism: English juries have notably acquitted 
Greenpeace climate change activists at Maidstone Crown court in 2008, 
peace campaigners at Bristol Crown court in 2007 (for damaging US B-52 
bombers at Fairford airbase in 2003, prior to the Iraq War) and at Brighton 
Crown court in 2010 (for breaking into and damaging the premises of EDO, 
a defense equipment manufacturer that had supplied the Israeli army).
For movement actors on trial, a jury is of both instrumental and symbolic 
value: the jury’s capacity for moral agency seemingly increases the prob-
abilities of a successful outcome (here, measured as acquittal); equally, 
the jury’s socially representative function means that activists may state 
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their case in front of citizens representing the democratic community as a 
whole. For example, in the September 2008 trial of the “Kingsnorth Six,” six 
Greenpeace activists who had broken into a coal-fired power station in Kent, 
England, were cleared of causing £30,000 of criminal damage by the majority 
verdict of a jury at Maidstone Crown court. The acquittal was won after the 
defendants claimed “lawful excuse” under the 1971 Criminal Damage Act, in 
what became widely known as the f irst “climate change defense” (Hilson, 
2010). Following the verdict, one of the defendants argued that
This verdict marks a tipping point for the climate change movement. 
When a jury of normal people say it is legitimate for a direct action group 
to shut down a coal-f ired power station because of the harm it does to 
our planet, then where does that leave Government energy policy? We 
have the clean technologies at hand to power our economy. It’s time we 
turned to them instead of coal.8
In contradistinction, in April 2009, 114 activists were arrested in Notting-
ham, England, for “conspiracy to commit aggravated trespass” by planning 
to shut down a coal-f ired power station at Ratcliffe-on-Soar, leading to two 
trials, of 20 activists in December 2010 and a further six, in January 2011. 
In the f irst trial, the activists, pleading lawful excuse, were found guilty 
(unanimously) by the jury, but given a mixture of small f ines, conditional 
discharges, and unpaid community service sentences by the judge, who 
underlined their sincerity, commitment, and courage; the second prosecu-
tion collapsed when it was revealed on the eve of the trial that one of the 
activists was an undercover police off icer, who had agreed to testify in favor 
of the defendants. One of the defendants initially found guilty in the f irst 
trial argued that in failing to convince a jury, they had failed a “revealing 
litmus test”:9
The jury received a more extensive education on climate change than 
most people get in a lifetime. That they could not vindicate our actions 
is nothing to get self-righteous about; it is deeply disturbing. If the jury, 
8 Michael McCarthy, “Cleared: Jury Decides That Threat of Global Warming Justif ies Breaking 
the Law.” The Independent, 11 September 2008.
9 Rob Evans and Paul Lewis, “Ratcliffe-on-Soar Activists Furious as No Disciplinary Charges 
Brought over Withheld Tapes.” The Guardian, 5 April 2012.
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after everything they had heard, couldn’t bring themselves to sympathise 
with our actions, who will?10
Juries are thus important players within the court arena as they are poten-
tially receptive to ideas of justice that exceed the justice that is limited to 
the letter of the law.
Legal Culture and Court Operation
This does not tell the whole story, however. Verdict possibilities are depend-
ent on the contingent availability in law of certain defenses, such as that 
of “lawful excuse.” And, beyond verdict probabilities, more complex are 
the effects that the presence of juries has on the organization and opera-
tion of the court arena. Civil law criminal procedure is inquisitorial and 
predominantly bureaucratic: the judge leads the questioning, with the 
role of lawyers for each side being to suggest to the judge the existence of 
certain problems or evidence, and to make a closing argument. The judge 
may retain witnesses until satisf ied with their testimony; there is no cross-
examination of defendants by counsel. As Spencer (2002) notes, the broad 
distinction between “inquisitorial” civil law and “adversarial” common 
law criminal procedures is over-stated. Yet, in the common law system, 
criminal procedure is essentially composed as (melo)dramatic performance, 
structured by rhetorical combat between defense and prosecution counsel, 
with the jury’s verdict providing a theatrical climax. Carrington (2003: 92) 
points out that a key aspect of jury trials is the oral nature of the conduct of 
the trial, itself fundamental to the construction of the trial as “a dramatic 
and not a bureaucratic event.”11
The role of the judge in common law jury trials is formally that of a 
neutral arbiter. Yet the judge has two important powers: directing the 
jury through summing up, and acting as a gatekeeper, with the capacity to 
prohibit the defense from submitting certain forms of evidence to the court. 
Two cases are illustrative of this power. In July 2009, 29 climate activists 
were prosecuted at Leeds Crown court in England under the 1861 Malicious 
Damage Act, for obstructing a train carrying coal to the Drax power station 
10 Bradley Day, “The Climate Movement Is in Desperate Need of Renewal.” The Guardian, 
5 January 2011.
11 This is, of course, the foundation for the jury trial as a staple of the plots of novels, plays, 
f ilms, and multiple TV series.
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in North Yorkshire the previous year.12 Because they were prosecuted under 
the 1861 Act rather than the 1971 Criminal Damage Act, the defendants had 
no entitlement to make a “lawful excuse” defense; instead, they sought to 
make a “necessity” defense, potentially available to defendants facing any 
criminal charge (Schwarz, 2010). However, the judge in this case ruled that 
the defendants were not allowed to mount a necessity defense based on 
climate change, effectively disbarring them from calling expert witness-
es.13 Unable to present the defense they had planned, the defendants were 
resigned in advance to being found guilty by the jury. The trial’s dramatic 
potential, and media and political impact, were minimized.14
The second case is United States v. DeChristopher, from another com-
mon law tradition. DeChristopher was sentenced in June 2011 to a two-year 
prison sentence in California for a climate change action in Salt Lake City 
in December 2008, for disrupting a federal auction of oil and gas drilling 
rights in south Utah by pretending to be a bona fide bidder. Offered pre-trial 
mediation, DeChristopher refused, choosing to put his case before a jury, 
arguing that
As citizens have been squeezed out of the political process in general, 
the role of citizens in our legal system has been minimized, and power 
has been concentrated into the hands of judges and into government 
off icials.… And I wanted to put the power in the hands of citizens rather 
than in the hands of government off icials.15
The trial judge, however, refused to let DeChristopher put forward a po-
litical necessity defense, arguing that in cases of so-called “indirect” civil 
disobedience – where action breaks not the contested law itself, but only a 
circumstantially related one (DeChristopher’s action did not break the law 
enabling the state to auction land permits, but rather the laws against false 
representation) – a defendant has no grounds to present such a defense. The 
judge’s decision is consistent with the jurisprudence set by a 1992 ruling of 
the Ninth Circuit, in United Sates v. Schoon, regarding the prosecution of 
activists who staged a protest against US policy in El Salvador by illegally 
12 Seven pleaded guilty; the trial was thus of the 22 activists who pleaded not guilty.
13 Though the judge did in fact allow two defendants to discuss climate change during their 
own testimony.
14 Discussion with two Drax defendants, March 2012.
15 Jason Mark, “Tim DeChristopher Speaks about His Impending Prison Sen-
tence.” 14  June 2011, http://www.earthisland.org/journal/index.php/elist/eListRead/
tim_dechristopher_speaks_about_his_impending_prison_sentence.
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entering the IRS off ices in Tucson, Arizona, in December 1989. Prior to 
this ruling, activists had regularly been successful in US state courts (on 
issues such as US policy in Central America, nuclear power and weaponry, 
apartheid, the politics of the CIA), winning jury acquittals or having charges 
dropped (Cavallaro, 1993: 361-362). Unable to explain why he broke the law, 
DeChristopher was found guilty in March 2011 by the unanimous verdict 
of a jury able to hear the details of the offences, but not the motivations for 
committing them.
The Tactical Choices of Movement Players
Attention to criminal justice systems enables us to identify reasonably 
stable, long-term properties affecting the organization and operation of 
trial proceedings, which differ between state (and even sub-state) context, 
and which produce a balance of probabilities of trial outcomes for social 
movement players subjected to these proceedings. However, these proper-
ties, though (axiomatically) subject only occasionally to renegotiation and 
change, are also a site of strategic interaction, adversarial negotiation, and 
discursive contest, undertaken by state and non-state players seeking to 
maximize their political advantage within the court arena.
Defendants in criminal trials are faced with a profound power imbalance, 
which governs not just the potential outcomes, but also the terms of their 
appearance in court. The decision whether and whom to prosecute, and 
the terms of the indictment, are the preserve of the public prosecutor. 
These decisions may have powerful material effects on the defendants, 
dividing groups (when some are prosecuted and others not), excluding some 
defenses and allowing others, configuring arenas with or without juries, 
and permitting or denying players to go to trial.
For movement players faced with this power imbalance, the most fun-
damental decision is whether to recognize or reject the authority of the 
court. For example, considering trials a propaganda opportunity, in 1905 
Lenin instructed members of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party 
to represent themselves in court and challenge the legitimacy of the trial 
process. This model was subsequently developed by French communist 
lawyers representing combatants in post-war decolonization struggles in 
Africa. Most famously, in the 1957 trial of four members of the Front de 
Libération Nationale (FLN) accused of participating in a bombing campaign 
in Algiers, defense lawyer Jacques Vergès developed a défense de rupture, 
using the trial to challenge the legitimacy of the state, refusing courtroom 
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codes, and turning the judicial process into a political event located outside 
the courthouse (Israël, 2009: 63-71). More counterculturally, the defendants 
in the Chicago Eight conspiracy trial systematically violated the court’s 
ceremonial codes of deference and demeanor, acting in a fashion “consistent 
with their self conceptions as revolutionaries” and “actively assert[ing] 
the validity of their values over those of the court and the wider society it 
represents” (Antonio, 1972: 295).
Such “rupture” defenses are relatively rare, anti-colonial, revolution-
ary and terrorist movements excepted (de Graaf et al., 2013). Few trials of 
movement actors involve explicit attempts to undermine the authority of 
the court in this way. Defendants therefore have to decide how to engage 
in the arena of the court tactically as players. Given that those indicted as 
movement players invariably believe that their own actions are legitimate, 
the strategic dilemma that they typically face is between maximizing their 
chances of acquittal, by exploiting the opportunities provided by the legal 
system, and prioritizing the presentation of their action as authentic, ir-
respective of the effects this will have on the legal outcome. The choice 
between these strategies can vary even within the same compound group 
of players.
For example, during the mid-1980s, there were hundreds of trials of 
women from the anti-nuclear peace camp at RAF Greenham Common in 
Berkshire, set up to protest the deployment of Cruise missiles in the UK. 
Rather than seeking an acquittal, the Greenham women often adopted 
symbolic defenses, stating their case in court by citing international law or 
their own personal experience. However, if the opportunity arose to expose 
inconsistencies (or downright lies) in the evidence of police or others, and 
gain an acquittal, most took it. Defendants typically refused to conform 
to the hierarchies of court decorum: supporters in the gallery frequently 
interrupted proceedings, humming or singing when the police were giving 
evidence. More than anything, the process was unpredictable. The court 
off icials had no way of knowing if a defendant would plead guilty so that 
the case was over fast (which the defendants might do if, for example, 
they needed to be somewhere else the next day); or whether they would 
plead not guilty, calling expert witnesses, effectively making the trial last 
several days. As time went on, more women chose to defend themselves, 
partly as a matter of resources (because applications for legal aid were 
refused), partly as a matter of political strategy (because it gave them more 
freedom to speak). Having themselves attended so many trials as one type of 
player (supporters, defendants), they thus became able to act as other types 
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of player, becoming experts in cross-examination and court procedure, 
learning rules and gambits (Roseneil 1995: 253-259).
Securing access to particular arenas can be the subject of tactical battles 
in themselves. For example, in England in the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
anti-GMO activists waged a battle with the Crown Prosecution Service over 
access to jury trials: as an activist newsletter reported, “The Crown became 
somewhat reluctant to press for damages of over £5,000 because this gives 
activists the right to ask for a trial by jury rather than a magistrate.”16 Prosecu-
tors would claim that there had been hardly any damage; campaigners would 
claim that they had in fact caused plenty, in order to try to get a jury trial.
In France, Les Déboulonneurs commit regular, open and public direct 
action against billboards, seeking to impose a maximum size of 40 cm x 
30 cm on commercial advertising posters. For the group, which is based 
in a handful of French cities but mobilizes relatively few core activists, 
being prosecuted is a strategic aim. Yet the complaint of many activists is 
that they are unable to get themselves prosecuted; often, they can’t even 
get themselves arrested.17 Since 2005, activists have undertaken over 40 
actions in Lille and over 50 in Paris; nationally, only about 1 in 15 actions has 
produced a prosecution. The tactical choices made in the knowledge that 
action would lead to arrest and thence to trial could thus be undermined 
by operational decisions made by police not to arrest, and state prosecutors 
not to pursue the case.
Tactical conflict between players therefore centers on liability, and on 
the configuration of and access to the judicial arena. In relation to this we 
can distinguish between three common strategic approaches by movement 
players: (1) where the trial is anticipated and planned for as an end in itself, as 
in the Plowshares anti-nuclear movements; (2) where activists seek to avoid 
arrest, but once arrested adapt their strategy to maximize the opportunities 
available in the legal arena, such as animal rights or radical environmental 
activists prosecuted for acts of sabotage; (3) an intermediate position in 
which individuals adopt a pragmatic position that varies according to the 
kinds of action taken, since in some cases arrest is to be expected (as in site 
occupations) whereas in others (such as covert crop trashes) it might be 
avoided. For the first of these types of group, preparation for trials is typically 
much more codif ied by movement traditions than for the other groups.
What is at stake for all those prosecuted in cases of citizenship crimes 
is precisely the symbolic meaning of acts, their def inition as criminal or 
16 Genetix Update, 20, Winter 2001.
17 Discussion with N., Paris, September 2011.
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lawful. We may surmise that defendants, where they engage with the trial 
process and seek to present a justif ication of their acts, will have four broad 
objectives: (1) to construct the social nature of their offence; (2) to broaden 
the focus of the indictment from its narrowly legal character (whether a 
given offence has been committed in law) to its political character (the rea-
sons for the committal of the offence); (3) to thus engage the moral agency 
of the court’s decisional players, and secure favorable outcomes within and 
outside the court space; (4) in so doing, to reveal the norms and dispositions 
underpinning the legal system as ideologically structured. Though tacti-
cally disadvantaged by the structure of the trial process, defendants can 
mobilize f ive sets of players in order to achieve these goals: the defendants 
themselves; their lawyers; the witnesses that they call; their supporters, 
inside and outside the courtroom; third parties, such as the media.
The number of players who are actual or potential opponents for move-
ments facing prosecution is at least as numerous, including – within the 
court – judges, prosecutors, witnesses (usually including the police); and 
beyond the court: government ministers (whose role varies according to the 
structure of the political system), corporate actors, countermovements and 
once again, the media. The separation of powers may protect the judicial 
system from overt political interference but in direct action prosecutions, 
normal practice may be broken or suspended. For example, following the 
acquittal of Greenpeace UK activists at Kingsnorth in 2008 the energy 
company that owned the power plant lobbied the government to impose 
stiffer sentences on climate campaigners as a deterrent against similar 
protests.18 The 2009 Drax and 2010 Ratcliffe-on-Soar UK convictions of 
climate activists (discussed above) were overturned on appeal when it 
emerged that the rules of the legal process had been broken by the Crown 
Prosecution Service, which had failed to pass crucial evidence gathered by 
an undercover policeman to the defense. Thus, although often disguised 
by state secrecy, the state is not a unitary institution: tactical interaction 
between different players within the state and with other opponents of 
movements is evidently a material factor affecting trials for direct action 
crimes. Furthermore, abuse of process by the state, when discovered, causes 
major political damage to the authorities.19
18 James Ball, “E.ON Lobbied For Stiff Sentences against Kingsnorth Activists, Papers Show,” 
The Guardian, 19 February 2013.
19 The success of activists and journalists as well as the bravery of police whistleblowers in 
exposing the work of undercover units that target political activists led the UK government to 
concede, reluctantly, the need for an independent inquiry into their role. 
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Social Crime and Event Construction
As Vanhala points out, one of the main problems facing collective actors 
in the courts is that the justice system is “inherently individualistic,” with 
legal process generally focused on “an individual with a concrete issue that 
requires a legal resolution” (2011: 12). Indeed, prosecution players can be 
expected to mobilize the rules of the arena to change the nature of their 
opponents, to transform compound players into simple players; a strategic 
challenge for activists is therefore to remain compound players. Securing a 
collective prosecution with its attendant possibilities of imposing costs on 
opponents and creating occasions for solidarity displays from supporters 
can itself be a goal of action. State players thus face potential decision-
making dilemmas over arrest and charging that mirror the plight of the 
Déboulonneurs (above).
For example, the French Faucheurs Volontaires have adapted their tactics 
across multiple trials in order to anticipate the response of police to their 
f ield actions. This adaptation involves establishing, prior to undertaking an 
action, a set of common verbal responses for use under police questioning, 
in order to forestall prosecutors from differentiating leaders from followers 
(and thus differentiating between them in their own decision making, 
including whom to prosecute and on what charges). This tactic has proved 
increasingly successful for the Faucheurs, resulting in a series of signif icant 
collective trials. In the UK, recent guidance from the Crown Prosecution 
Service explicitly directs prosecutors toward identifying and prosecuting 
protest organizers, and thus targeting the most disruptive players (Bowcott, 
2012). In the case of the 145 UK Uncut activists arrested by the police for oc-
cupying the Fortnum & Mason’s luxury store in Piccadilly, central London, 
in a corporate tax avoidance protest in March 2011, prosecutors singled out 
30 for trial. This whittling down was undertaken on the basis that protesters 
were prosecuted if they were carrying megaphones, beach balls, or at least 
20 UK Uncut leaflets at the time of arrest. The seeming arbitrariness of this 
distinction produced an absurd outcome: during the trial, one defendant 
was released without charge when it transpired that some of her leaflets 
were in fact theater ticket stubs, and she did not after all have the requisite 
number to be prosecuted.
Within the court arena, penalties are applied individually, according 
to role and motive; again, while magistrates and prosecution lawyers may 
aim to differentiate, defendants and defense lawyers can be expected 
to maintain the collective nature of responsibility. Equally, in order to 
establish the collective legitimacy of their action, defendants are foremost 
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faced with socializing their action, whether by demonstrating community 
support, testifying to the integrity of their motives and the collective good 
of their objectives, or by mobilizing other players (supporters in the court-
house, moral witnesses). In their own testimony, defendants may seek to 
establish the ethical basis of their acts through the “moral presentation 
of self” (Schervish, 1984: 196), establishing their character, integrity, and 
biographical commitment to the cause, in the way that impressed the judge 
in the f irst Ratcliffe trial.
Whether players are individual or compound players, and what type of 
compound players, therefore emerges as a strategic outcome of the trial 
process. We may expect that, especially where defendant players have 
deliberately courted prosecution, socializing crime is both a key symbolic 
aim and embedded in the original strategic planning of illegal action. For 
example, in the Lyng anti-GMO action for which 28 activists were tried in 
Norwich, Greenpeace deliberately sought to replicate the social representa-
tivity of the trial jury by constructing the activist group as a cross-section of 
the general public (in age, regional origin, gender and social background).20 
In the trial of 62 French anti-GMO activists in Colmar in September 2011, the 
defendants similarly aimed to be representative of the French population as 
a whole.21 In Belgium, where 11 activists were prosecuted in January 2013 on 
charges of organized criminality for having destroyed a f ield of genetically 
modif ied potatoes in May 2011, the Field Liberation Movement consciously 
foregrounded the presence of Dutch-speaking activists, while adopting the 
tactic of self-indictment from the French Faucheurs Volontaires in order to 
build solidarity outside the courthouse; 80 supporters signed an aff idavit 
demanding to be placed on trial alongside the defendants.22
Defendants may also typically be expected to attempt to shift the 
focus from the defense of their own actions to the “prosecution” of their 
opponents, as the case of the December 2010 trial in Caen, France, of six 
anti-nuclear activists demonstrates. The previous month, the activists had 
physically blocked a train carrying vitrif ied nuclear waste traveling from 
Valognes in Normandy to Gorleben in Germany, using what is now the 
routine practice of chaining themselves to the rail track and to each other. 
Throughout the trial, the prosecution and defense were constantly engaged 
in a contest to def ine the process: the prosecution sought to restrict debate 
20 Discussion with Greenpeace defendant, Stafford, June 2008.
21 Discussion with three Faucheurs Volontaires activists, Ghent, May 2011. Note that in neither 
case did social representativity involve ethnic diversity.
22 Discussion with FLM defendants, Brussels, July 2011.
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to the bare facts of the action (themselves uncontested by the defendants), 
and thus to depoliticize the legal process; the defense sought to generalize, 
to draw the debate into political terms, establishing their motivation as 
democratic, asserting the contradiction between a nuclearized society and 
participative citizenship:
C.: Our goal is to create a real debate about nuclear power, the public has 
never been consulted.
State prosecutor: It’s not in court that that type of debate can take place, 
but within the democratic organs of society. You are here to be judged 
for your actions, not to make the world anew.
C.: That’s exactly why I am here.23
The capacity of defendants to make these arguments is heavily dependent 
upon the gatekeeping role of the judge, who as a player in the court arena has 
scope for discretion. In the September 2011 Colmar trial, the presiding mag-
istrate gave the floor to each defendant in turn to explain the reasons why 
they had participated in the destruction of a scientif ic trial of genetically 
modified vine roots at the French National Agricultural Research Institute’s 
(INRA) local research facility the previous summer. In contrast, during the 
trial in Bobigny, France, in July 2012 of one environmental activist for having 
trespassed onto the runaway at Charles de Gaulle airport and stood in front 
of an Airbus the previous month in a protest against global warming, the 
presiding magistrate refused to let the defendant explain the motivations 
for his actions, bringing the defendant’s testimony to an abrupt close.24
In trials for direct action crimes, the witnesses called by the defense are 
particularly important in providing “expert” testimony as scientific or moral 
authorities (Hayes, 2013). As we have seen in the Drax and DeChristopher 
cases, this is again heavily dependent upon both the gatekeeping role of 
the magistrate and of previous judicial decisions. Given the public and 
contestatory nature of trials, it is perhaps unsurprising that Jasanoff sees 
“expert” testimony by scientists (where it is allowed) as a privileged site of 
co-production, of the public socialization of scientif ic knowledge (2004: 3). 
For Lynch, criminal cases can “provide vivid public tutorials on the flexible 
and contentious way in which parties negotiate the boundaries between 
science and non-science, and expert and non-expert knowledge” (2004: 
165). Thus in the Kingsnorth and Ratcliffe climate change trials, defendants 
23 Personal trial notes.
24 Personal trial notes.
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sought to substantiate a lawful excuse defense by calling expert testimony, 
arguing that their action prevented a greater harm. Climatologist James 
Hansen, Director of NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies, testif ied 
in court in both cases that accelerating coal use in the new century is “a 
prescription for planetary disaster,” concluding that this “would leave a 
reasonable person to take steps to urgently and deeply cut CO2 emissions.”
25
Typically therefore, defendants stress their biographical and ethical 
commitment, underline the social nature of their action in various ways, 
and mobilize other players to contextualize and legitimize their action 
or deliver a public pedagogy. This will be particularly important where 
defendants seek to mount a necessity or lawful excuse defense. But the 
importance of these tactics is not limited to the courtroom; rather, it is also 
a communicational strategy outside the courthouse.
Media coverage is crucial in this respect. Protesters need media coverage 
to be able to reach beyond the audience in the court and their existing sup-
porters. Ideally, for social movement actors, a trial will create a dramaturgy 
that will end with their vindication (through an acquittal), a demonstration 
of their commitment to the cause, and the wide publicization of their argu-
ments. Conviction and harsh penalties may alternatively work to increase 
solidarities within and beyond the core movement group. However, even 
when the media play their part in this drama by sending reporters, their 
increasingly limited time and resources means that most media organiza-
tions only cover the f irst and last days of the trial. These are the worst days 
from the activists’ perspective, since the f irst day is when the prosecution 
generally makes its case and the last day is when the verdict is given. The 
time in between, when activists give evidence and make their case, is the 
least likely to be reported.
Conclusion: Strategic Interaction in the Court Arena
There is perhaps no greater symbol of the power and purpose of the state 
than the criminal law, its procedures, processes, institutions, and person-
nel. As an arena, the criminal law functions to articulate, adjudicate, and 
discriminate: it def ines and announces prohibited conduct; it assesses 
liability for transgression; it constructs hierarchies of harm and culpability 
(Robinson, 1994). By its very definition, it patrols and polices the boundaries 
25 James Hansen, witness statement to trial of Ratcliffe activists, Nottingham Crown Court, 
September 2010.
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of the dominant social and political order, and it sets the terms of the inclu-
sion and exclusion of the citizenry within or from that order. Again by 
definition, when movement players oppose the specif ic or general terms of 
the social and political order, this brings them into the arena of the criminal 
law. But the courthouse is also an institutional arena in which various state 
(judge, prosecution, and police) and non-state players (lawyers, defendants, 
witnesses, civil parties, juries, media, even members of the public) come 
into direct discursive contact within the rules of engagement set by the 
law, by judicial procedure and process, and by the cultural organization 
of participation in this process. And as we have seen, it is also a site of the 
production of meaning in other senses, including of political challenge, and 
of the interplay of rational-legal justice with the “natural” justice of the jury.
We aim to stimulate further interest in the relationships between social 
movements and criminal justice, arguing that it is a vital area of collective 
action which has been curiously neglected in the literature until now. As 
readers will have noticed, our focus here is very much on Western democra-
cies, and we recognize that this does not address the major gap in the study 
of prosecutions of activists in other political and judicial systems. Clearly, 
to take perhaps the most high-profile trial of activists of recent times, the 
enormous international attention given to the Pussy Riot trial in Russia in 
2012 indicates the potential for taking the study of trials of direct action 
into non-Western and authoritarian settings. We hope this lacuna will 
rapidly be addressed.
Beyond this general goal, we make two specif ic arguments. The f irst 
is that, for criminal justice systems, we can identify stable, long-term, 
predictable terms of engagement set by formal rules of procedure which 
are different from system to system; that these rules are the subject of 
political and discursive engagement between players aiming to secure the 
most favorable terms within this arena; that the outcomes of this engage-
ment will be central to our understanding of the outcomes of criminal 
prosecutions, in terms of both their judicial impacts (the verdicts handed 
down) and their political impacts (crucially, setting the terms of meaning 
of the criminal prosecution).
The second argument is that criminal trials are complex processes which 
cannot a priori be reduced the simple imposition of authority by a unif ied 
state. We know that arrest and trial “can energize and elevate movements, 
increasing their support and chances of success” (Goldstone, 2004: 356; see 
also Koopmans, 2004: 29); we should at the very least note how prosecution 
enables solidarity and collective identity reinforcement processes. This is 
not to say that the courthouse is not also a theater of symbolic state power: 
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the rules of the game are set by state players, activists are rarely able to 
master the terms of engagement, arrest and trial are stressful events which 
impose f inancial, psychological, and emotional costs, irrespective of the 
court’s verdict, and can have strong negative as well as positive effects 
on both intra-group solidarities and the capacity of movement players 
to wage campaigns, and we should certainly be wary of casting them as 
necessarily beneficial or productive episodes for challenging actors. As one 
Belgian anti-GMO activist put it to us à propos of being taken to court in 
2004 for crop-trashing, “it’s heavy, it’s tiring, it destroys your life for years,” 
“it’s only when you’re in it that you begin to realize what the consequences 
are,” “you end up on the stand when you should be in a f ield.” Yet the same 
activist also described the trial as “a miracle”; “we won, and sparked off a 
public debate.”26 Beyond the multiple anecdotes provided by particular 
cases, criminal prosecutions hold our attention because they are normative 
crucibles in which the challenge to the dominant social and political order 
can be made by collective social actors. These players make tactical choices 
to use the possibilities presented by the arena of the courthouse to level 
political as well as legal challenge. Occasionally, they even succeed.
References
Andersen, Ellen Ann. 2005. Out of the Closets and into the Courts: Legal Opportunity Structure 
and Gay Rights Litigation. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Antonio, Robert J. 1972. “The Processual Dimension of Degradation Ceremonies: The Chicago 
Conspiracy Trial: Success or Failure?” British Journal of Sociology 23: 287-297.
Auld, Lord Justice. 2001. Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales, http://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.criminal-courts-review.org.uk/auldconts.htm.
Barkan, Steven. 1983. “Jury Nullif ication in Political Trials.” Social Problems 31: 28-44.
—. 2006. “Criminal Prosecution and the Legal Control of Protest.” Mobilization 11: 181-194.
Bedau, Hugo. A. 1991. “Introduction.” In Hugo A. Bedau, ed., Civil Disobedience in Focus. London: 
Routledge.
Bowcott, Owen. 2012. “Pursue Masked Protesters More Vigorously, CPS Says.” The Guardian, 
6 March.
Carrington, Paul D. 2003. “The Civil Jury and American Democracy.” Duke Journal of Comparative 
& International Law 13: 79-94.
Cavallaro, James L. Jr. 1993. “The Demise of the Political Necessity Defense: Indirect Civil 
Disobedience and United States v. Schoon.” California Law Review 81: 351-385.
De Fazio, Gianluca. 2012. “Legal Opportunity Structure and Social Movement Strategy in 
Northern Ireland and Southern United States.” International Journal of Comparative Sociology 
53: 3-22.
26 S., interview with Field Liberation Movement activists, Brussels, September 2011.
This content downloaded from 
             86.23.78.145 on Fri, 18 Dec 2020 08:38:36 UTC               
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
50 BrIan Dohert y anD Graeme hayeS 
De Graaf, B.A., et al. 2013. The Anders Behring Breivik Trial: Performing Justice, Defending 
Democracy. The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism.
Dinos, Jacques, and Marcel Gibelin. 1986. June ’36: Class Struggle and the Popular Front in France. 
Trans. Peter Fysh and Christine Bourry. London: Bookmarks.
Doherty, Brian, and Graeme Hayes. 2012. “Tactics, Traditions, and Opportunities: British and 
French Crop Trashing Actions in Comparative Perspective.” European Journal of Political 
Research 51: 540-562.
—. 2014. “Having Your Day in Court: Judicial Opportunity and Tactical Choice in Anti-GMO 
Campaigns in France and the United Kingdom.” Comparative Political Studies 47: 3-29.
Epp, Charles R. 1998. The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists, and Supreme Courts in Comparative 
Perspective. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Falk, Barbara J. 2008. “Making Sense of Political Trials: Causes and Categories.” Occasional Paper 
8, Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto.
Goldstone, Jack A. 2004. “More Social Movements or Fewer? Beyond Political Opportunity 
Structures to Relational Fields.” Theory and Society 33: 333-365.
Hay, Douglas, et al. 2011. Albion’s Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England. 
Revised ed. London and New York: Verso.
Hayes, Graeme. 2013. “Negotiating Proximity: Expert Testimony and Collective Memory in the 
Trials of Environmental Activists in France and the UK.” Law & Policy 35: 208-235.
Hilson, Chris. 2002. “New Social Movements: The Role of Legal Opportunity.” Journal of European 
Public Policy 9: 238-255.
—. 2010. “Climate Change Litigation: An Explanatory Approach (Or Bringing Grievance Back 
In).” In Fabrizio Fracchia and Massimo Occhiena, eds., Climate Change: La Riposta del Diritto. 
Naples, IT: Editoriale Scientif ica.
Hobsbawm, Eric J. 1969. Bandits. London: Weidenf ield & Nicolson.
Israël, Liora. 2009. L’Arme du droit. Paris: Presses de Sciences-Po.
Jasanoff, Sheila. 2004. “The Idiom of Co-Production.” In Sheila Jasanoff, ed., States of Knowledge: 
The Co-Production of Science and Social Order. London: Routledge.
Koopmans, Ruud. 2004. “Protest in Time and Space: The Evolution of Waves of Contention.” In 
David Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi, eds., The Blackwell Companion to Social 
Movements. Oxford: Blackwell.
Kunstler, William K. 1969. “Jury Nullif ication in Conscience Cases.” Virginia Journal of Inter-
national Law 10: 71-84.
Law Commission for England and Wales. 1989. Criminal Law: A Criminal Code for England and 
Wales, Vol. 1 (Law Com No. 177). London: HMSO.
Lea, John. 2002. Crime & Modernity: Continuities in Left Realist Criminology. London, Thousand 
Oaks and New Delhi: Sage.
Linebaugh, Peter. 2011. “Reflections.” In Douglas Hay et al., eds., Albion’s Fatal Tree: Crime and 
Society in Eighteenth-Century England. Revised ed. London and New York: Verso.
Lynch, Michael. 2004. “Circumscribing Expertise: Membership Categories in Courtroom 
Testimony.” In Sheila Jasanoff, ed., States of Knowledge: The Co-Production of Science and 
Social Order. London: Routledge.
McCann, Michael W. 1994. Rights at Work: Pay Equity Reform and the Politics of Legal Mobilization. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Melucci, Alberto. 1985. “The Symbolic Challenge of Contemporary Movements.” Social Research 
52: 789-816.
Ministry of Justice. 2011. Judicial and Court Statistics 2010, http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/
statistics/courts-and-sentencing/judicial-court-stats.pdf.
This content downloaded from 
             86.23.78.145 on Fri, 18 Dec 2020 08:38:36 UTC               
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
the courtS 51
Pole, J. R. 2002. “‘A Quest of Thoughts’: Representation and Moral Agency in the Early Anglo-
American Jury.” In John W. Cairns and Grant McLeod, eds., The Dearest Birth Right of the 
People of England: The Jury in the History of the Common Law. Portland, OR: Hart.
Rawls, John. 1991. “Def inition and Justif ication of Civil Disobedience.” In Hugo A. Bedau, ed., 
Civil Disobedience in Focus. London: Routledge.
Robinson, Paul H. 1994. “A Functional Analysis of Criminal Law.” Northwestern University Law 
Review 88: 857-913.
Roseneil, Sasha. 1995. Disarming Patriarchy. Buckingham: Open University Press.
Rule, John. 1997. “Social Crime in the Rural South in the Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth 
Centuries.” In John Rule and Roger Wells, eds., Crime, Protest and Popular Politics in Southern 
England, 1740-1850. London: Hambledon Press.
Sarat, Austin, and Stuart A. Scheingold. 1998. “Cause Lawyering and the Production of 
Professional Authority: An Introduction.” In Austin Sarat and Stuart A. Scheingold, eds., 
Cause Lawyering: Political Commitments and Professional Responsibilities. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
—. 2005. “The Dynamics of Cause Lawyering. Constraints and Opportunities.” In Austin Sarat 
and Stuart A. Scheingold, eds., The Worlds Cause Lawyers Make: Structure and Agency in 
Legal Practice. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Scheingold, Stuart A. 2010. The Politics of Rights: Lawyers, Public Policy and Political Change, 2nd 
ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Schervish, Paul G. 1984. “Political Trials and the Social Construction of Deviance.” Qualitative 
Sociology 7: 195-216.
Schwarz, Mike. 2010. “The Drax 29 and the Kingsnorth 6: Different Defences, Different Out-
comes.” ELFLine, Spring/Summer.
Spencer, J.R. 2002. “Introduction.” In Mireille Delmas-Marty and J. R. Spencer, eds., European 
Criminal Procedures. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stengers, Isabelle. 2004. “Une pratique cosmopolitique du droit est-elle possible? Entretien avec 
Laurent de Sutter.” Cosmopolitiques 8: 14-33.
Thompson, Edward P. 1975. Whigs and Hunters. London: Penguin.
—. 1986. “Subduing the Jury.” London Review of Books, 18 December.
Tilly, Charles. 1978. From Mobilization to Revolution. New York: McGraw-Hill.
—. 1995. Popular Contention in Great Britain, 1758-1834. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Tocqueville, Alexis de. 1961. De la Démocratie en Amérique, Tome 1. 12th ed. Paris: Gallimard.
Vanhala, Lisa. 2011. Making Rights a Reality? Disability Rights Activists and Legal Mobilization. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Weinstein, Jack B. 1992. “Considering Jury ‘Nullif ication’: When May and Should a Jury Reject 
the Law to do Justice.” American Criminal Law Review 30: 239-254.
This content downloaded from 
             86.23.78.145 on Fri, 18 Dec 2020 08:38:36 UTC               
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
This content downloaded from 
             86.23.78.145 on Fri, 18 Dec 2020 08:38:36 UTC               
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
